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Israel-Turkey
Relations: Present and Future |
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Is there a crisis in Israeli-Turkish relations? Lately there have been several bilateral problems and frictions as well as structural changes in Turkey that do not seem to bode well. The list includes: --Highly critical statements about Israel by Prime Minister Recep Erdogan, leader of the Islamic-oriented Justice and Development party. It should be noted, though, that what he said is almost precisely the same as remarks made by his left-wing predecessor Bulent Ecevit. Moreover, Erdogan was careful to insist that he wanted relations to remain strong. --The temporary recall of the Turkish ambassador to Israel for consultations. This is about the lowest-level diplomatic sign of protest one can make. --Cancellation of one military contract in which Israel was involved. This is part, though, of an overall (and quite understandable) cutback in military spending pushed by Erdogan's government in the face of Turkey's economic problems. Other contracts involving Israeli companies have not been affected. --A brief crisis involving Israel's security rights at the Istanbul airport that led to a temporary cessation of El Al flights. This seems to have been a technical problem which was quickly resolved. --The apparent leak of a story to a sensationalistic American journalist that Israel was creating a Kurdish militia in northern Iraq aimed against Iran. Paranoia about alleged Israeli support for an independent Kurdish state is a mainstay of a general Turkish paranoia on this issue. Without trying to minimize the problems, then, these events add up to much less than it may seem. There is no general crisis in relations and the Turkish government does not want one. Unfortunately, one must cynically add a couple of additional points here. These actions come immediately after Turkey got two big things it wanted from Israel--the long-negotiated deal for Israel to import Turkish water and a major contract for construction on an Israeli power plant. Thus, it was a moment when a Turkish government could score some domestic and regional points by criticizing Israel's defensive war against the Palestinians at little cost or risk. More broadly, this series of events is part of a global pattern in which countries love to bully Israel while proclaiming that it is acting as a bully. Israel is an easy target because bashing it wins applause at home, may help relations with the Arab or Muslim world, and Israel is unlikely or unable to retaliate. This situation has some parallels with how Jews were treated in the Middle Ages and later times in Europe, except that today such behavior rarely affects their well-being or security. Of more concern are some structural changes in Turkey and its international role. Key among these is the rule of an Islamic party, declining power of the military, justified as a measure strengthening democracy, and Turkey's moves toward membership in the European Union. Erdogan has tried to build the Islamic equivalent of a Christian Democratic party in Europe (or perhaps one might say the religious parties in Israel), that is a conservative grouping which promotes the interests of religious institutions and sectors of the population without trying to seize dictatorial control and transform the state. In contrast to these other parties, however, Erdogan's contains radical Islamist elements. Distancing himself somewhat from Israel is a no-cost way to appease these forces who are unhappy about many of his other policies. This same factor, however, limits how far Erdogan can, or wants to, go in that direction. The rest of Turkish society--including many secular elements which are extremely suspicious of him--is watching his government closely. A real break with Israel would be taken as a symbol that he is moving in an Islamist direction and spark major opposition within the country. Erdogan is very much aware of this problem. Within Turkey, the military has been an important force pushing toward good relations with Israel. The country's economic problems have led to a reduction in the amount of money for military spending. Its efforts to enter the EU have led to democratic reforms which have tried to reduce the armed forces' political power. This has weakened one important pillar of the bilateral relationship but the continued importance of the military should not be underestimated. Again, Erdogan knows he must be careful lest he provoke a reaction against himself. As for the EU, a situation currently exists that would have deeply shocked Turks a year ago: Cyprus, a large part of which is occupied by Turkish troops, is now a member of that organization while Turkey's status remains unresolved. In December, the EU is supposed to decide about whether to embark upon an estimated decade-long series of negotiations to make Turkey a full member. Although the outcome is still unknown, many observers now claim that Turkey will get a green light. It is ironic that this great prize, denied to so many Turkish secular governments, will be given to an Islamic one. Aside from the factor of time, the reason is that if an Islamic government can govern Turkey democratically--and even make moderating reforms--there is arguably little to fear about Turkey becoming an Islamist state. The outcome could be that Turkey would fall into line with Europe's relatively hostile (albeit with many variations and some exceptions) stance on Israel. If membership were to move Turkey further from the United States, a country which remains the strongest advocate of the EU admitting Turkey, this would be another step in that direction. There is thus real reason for concern. But it is still too early to say in what direction Turkish-Israel relations will go. The staying power of this alliance should not be underestimated; short-term ripples should not be overstated.
Professor Barry Rubin, Director, Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center Editor, Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal Editor, Turkish Studies Barry Rubin's columns can now be read online at http://gloria.idc.ac.il/columns/column.html.
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